The challenges differ from containersBy Peter A. Buxbaum, AJOTMuch has been made over the last five years about the security challenges associated with containerized cargo; but what about other kinds of cargo? When politicians seek to alarm the public about terror vulnerabilities, it is to containerized cargo that they most often point. The thrust of their concerns is that terrorists might try to smuggle radiological, biological, or chemical materials into the country inside a container. But two recent reports, one from the National Infrastructure Institute Center for Infrastructure Expertise in Portsmouth, NH, and another from the Congressional Research Service in Washington, DC, point out that by emphasizing container security, the US government might be neglecting vulnerabilities in other areas, such as autos. One auto carrier official even admitted that he is gratified by the lack of negative media attention reserved for their side of the cargo business. “We are subject to much the same set of regulations as the container guys,” noted Dan Conaton, head of global security for Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics, “but when members of Congress focus on transportation risks, they talk about containers in their sound bites. We don’t want publicity so we’re happy about that.” The Congressional Research Service report, “Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities,” asserted “some types of non-containerized cargo could be used for smuggling a bomb„ and, the “biggest concern is roll-on/roll-off cargo, ships that carry automobiles, trucks, and other vehicles.” CRS also points out that non-containerized cargo is far more plentiful than containers. “By tonnage, containers carry only 11% of US overseas waterborne trade and container ships account for about one in every three US port calls,” the report notes. “Other types of cargo also face less security screening.” The National Infrastructure Institute Center for Infrastructure Expertise report, entitled “Using Technology to Bridge Maritime Security Gaps,” in essence regards each of the tens of thousands of vehicles in transit around the world on a daily basis as a container in and of itself. “Often, these vehicles are kept at the holding facilities where they are manufactured until they are ready for shipment,” the report said. “Similarly, once off-loaded from the ship, thousands of vehicles are driven by longshoremen into a holding area and made ready for the next leg of their journey through the supply chain. It is at the load port, arriving port’s vehicle holding-facilities, and during the sea transport phase, when the vehicle is vulnerable to the possibility of it being converted to a possible weapon delivery tool.” Industry officials downplay the concerns evoked in that report. “Autos and ro/ro have their own security challenges, although they are not as complex as for containers,” said Conaton. “The purpose of containers, by their very reason for existence, is to get out there and be mixed with the general population. They are delivered directly to warehouses and stores. That is part of the efficiency of that kind of cargo. With ro/ro, we are dealing primarily with newly manufactured goods, which by definition are not out in the public. Manufacturers don’t want the public moving in with their goods.” “The majority of newly manufactured autos and ro/ro cargoes are handled in a very short and controlled logistics chain,” added James Perduto, vice president for marketing at Höegh Autoliners, Inc. “The cars are produced in a factory and then are delivered by rail or truck directly to port terminals. Then they go straight aboard ship. In numerous cases, such as autos imported from the Far East, the vehicles are built and stored for shipment at the port terminal of export.” The National Infrastructure Institute Center report also makes suggestions for how best to shore up security for autos and ro/ro cargo. The report contends that “even with closed circuit television and other monitoring devices