- The evolution of payment card theft
- Magecart infrastructure: what it looks like, how to detect it, and how it’s evolving
- Why e-commerce sites and consumers are at risk
- The Magecart operators' offline rackets and why they work
- Guidance for e-commerce site owners and why having a dynamic view of their digital footprint is key to defending themselves
New report uncovers a direct link to the outcome of stolen credit cards
posted by AJOT | Jul 12 2017 at 09:06 AM | International Trade
RiskIQ researchers track e-commerce threat Magecart Part II, discover network of threat actors physically reshipping items purchased with stolen cards via U.S. mules
SAN FRANCISCO, July 12, 2017 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- In October of last year, the RiskIQ Threat Research team released "Compromised E-commerce Sites Lead to Magecart," a report profiling the e-commerce threat they discovered and dubbed 'Magecart,' which injects JavaScript code into e-commerce sites running outdated and unpatched versions of shopping cart software from Magento, Powerfront, and OpenCart. By logging consumer keystrokes, these attackers capture large quantities of payment card information.
Now, by following a new strain of Magecart, the team has discovered a direct link to the outcome of the stolen credit cards for threat actors, offering rare insight into the physical world operations of actors tied to digital threats.
The report, "Magecart Part II: From JavaScript Injects to Reshipping for Financial Gain," highlights how threat actors targeting e-commerce sites cash out by reshipping items purchased with stolen cards via a physical reshipping company, operating with mules in the U.S.
In light of the recent Krebs on Security blog post, which ties Magecart infrastructure listed in our original report to a credit card dumps website known as “Trump’s Dumps,” it’s clear that these actors have a diversified portfolio of rackets for monetizing their plunder.
"Magecart activity is still going strong, affecting new sites and continuing to register new domains to host the injected web skimmer scripts," said Yonathan Klijnsma, threat researcher at RiskIQ. "New insight into the sophisticated way these actors are monetizing their activities in the physical world shows the broadness of their scope of operations."
By pivoting on a domain related to known Magecart activity in RiskIQ PassiveTotal, the team found that the server behind its IP address, currently used for the injects of the Magecart script, also links to a reshipping company website falsely advertised as a freight/logistics provider.
Via false employment ads on Russian job websites for U.S.-based job seekers, mules are recruited under the pretense of “transport agents,” tasked with receiving shipments of electronics and other goods bought with stolen credit cards to ship to an address in Eastern Europe. This technique is similar to more traditional schemes involving money mules, but rather than a direct transfer of funds, the actors behind Magecart transfer funds into higher-priced goods, which can be shipped across borders without suspicion then sold for a hefty profit.
“Magecart Part II: From JavaScript Injects to Reshipping for Financial Gain” takes a deep dive into: